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foreign secretary mrs nirupama Rao 
(previously an ambassador to China 
and current Ambassador to the us) 
noted that between 2005 and 2010, 
Prime minister manmohan singh 
and Premier Wen Jiabao had met no 
less than 11 times. Following Premier 
Wen’s official visit to new delhi 
in december 2010, the two sides 
agreed to institute a strategic bilateral 
economic dialogue, the first meeting of 
which will take place in late september 
this year.
The issue is whether any of these 
tensions could be better eased through 
participation in plurilateral groupings 
rather than purely bilaterally, and, if so, 
what such a grouping might look like. 
At the global level, India and China 
are leading emerging-market members 
of the G20 and have coordinated 
their positions in areas such as the 
multilateral trading system, reform of 
the international financial institutions 
and climate change finance. The 
competitive issues are likely to be 
sharper within Asia, where India has 
valid concerns of being marginalised 
by Chinese trade and finance in a 
dynamic region of historic, cultural 
and strategic interest to it.
These issues of regional economic 
architecture are yet to receive 
sustained attention within the Indian 
establishment. much will depend on 
how an expanded East Asia summit, 
now to include Russia and the us, 
begins to function on security issues, 
and on whether that expanded EAs 
generates any economic coordination 
mechanism similar to that provided 
by AsEAn+3. In my view, India 
should embrace the EAs process 
vigorously as a way of complementing 
bilateral contacts with China that 
span economic and security issues. 
Whether this would also be the 
Chinese preference remains to be seen.
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E Ast Asia’s pursuit of policy strategies of openness to trade 
and investment have resulted in its 
being economically one of the world’s 
most internationally-integrated 
regions — both intraregionally and 
towards the rest of the world. south 
Asia, on the other hand, is one of the 
world’s least integrated regions and, 
measured in terms of intraregional 
trade as a share of total trade, is the 
region with the lowest integration 
globally. Intraregional trade in south 
Asia was 3.5 per cent of total south 
Asian trade in 2009, up from a low of 
2 per cent in 1967 but significantly 
lower than the 19 per cent in 1948. 
Intraregional trade in East Asia was 40 
per cent in 2009.
The differences in regional 
economic integration mean that the 
effect of political tensions between 
countries on trade is more pronounced 
for south Asia than it is in East Asia.
trading partnerships between 
open economies are determined by 
comparative advantage and market 
forces, and the advantages of proximity 
are also important. A region with low 
economic integration is likely to be 
losing out on the benefits that flow 
from trade due to economic proximity. 
but additionally, because political 
interactions tend to occur much 
more frequently between neighbours, 
higher economic interdependence 
can ameliorate the adverse effects 
of political tensions that may arise 
between neighbouring countries. 
Political tensions can, of course, act 
as a barrier to economic integration; 
and lack of economic integration 
and interdependence can constrain 
improving political relations. The 
relationship between India and 
Pakistan is an obvious example of 
the latter. The East Asian case is 
very different, where the region’s 
economies enjoy high levels of trade 
and economic integration, despite 
unresolved historical issues and long-
standing political mistrust in some of 
the region’s bilateral relationships.
Political tensions between Japan and 
China from 2001 to 2006, for example, 
rose to a level where leadership 
visits between the two countries 
were suspended and there were large 
protests in China against Japan and 
boycotts aimed at Japanese goods. yet 
these political tensions did not derail 
economic relations, nor significantly 
affect the continued growth of sino-
Japanese trade. The start of this period 
of political tension coincided with 
China's accession to the World trade 
organisation (Wto) in december 
2001.
It was not simply the increased 
trade and positive news from China 
joining the Wto that offset the 
conflict and tension between Japan and 
China. but it was China's commitment 
to the global trading system after 
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1986, with rapid trade liberalisation 
and economic reform, that gave 
Japanese firms confidence in dealing 
with Chinese counterparts. China 
steadily adopted, and constrained itself 
to, global trading rules and norms 
through its 15-year accession march 
towards membership of the GAtt and 
later the Wto. The experience of the 
Japan-China relationship shows the 
importance of countries' integrating 
into the global economy and being 
part of the global trading system for 
bilateral relationships to prosper.
The experience of the cross-straits 
(China-taiwan) relationship highlights 
the importance of intraregional 
economic integration in improving 
bilateral economic relations. Political 
relations between beijing and taipei 
have been even more difficult than 
Japan-China relations.  taiwan had 
banned imports from China up until 
the early 1990s for political reasons. 
In the 1990s, these bans were lifted 
gradually, and then more rapidly after 
both China’s and taiwan’s accession to 
the Wto in 2001. taiwan and China 
have become increasingly integrated 
into the complex production networks 
in East Asia. As their economies’ 
integration into the regional economy 
deepened, indirect interdependence 
increased and the indirect as well 
as the direct costs of taiwan’s 
discrimination against mainland 
Chinese imports became more 
apparent. The trading relationship is 
now more ‘normal’ despite the residual 
trade bans that are still in place. deep 
integration into the regional economy 
has carried the bilateral taiwan-China 
economic relationship beyond being 
simply bilateral in nature. 
In contrast, the non-integrating 
East Asian economies of north Korea 
and myanmar are important examples 
of closed economies whose bilateral 
relations with their neighbours and 
beyond are dominated by political 
conflict. 
unlike taiwan-China relations, 
where impediments to trade were 
reduced over time as the regional 
economy became more integrated 
around them, the under-development 
of south Asian economic integration 
and interdependence means there is 
less incentive to reduce barriers to 
trade or improve poor infrastructure, 
lift bans on investment and ease 
people movement across borders. 
Pakistan is yet to reciprocate most 
favoured nation (mFn) status in trade 
with India and maintains a narrow 
positive list (786 items) of goods 
that India may export to Pakistan. 
At the same time, India’s tariff rates 
remain high, especially for goods of 
particular interest to Pakistan, such 
as textiles, leather and onyx, and 
non-tariff barriers are substantial. 
The relationship between India and 
Pakistan is not nested in robust 
regional cooperation, so bilateral 
economic dealings are swamped 
by bilateral political dealings and 
negative-sum or zero-sum security 
issues. 
East Asia’s experience suggests that 
bilateral economic relations nested 
in a highly integrated region that is 
outward-looking and globally oriented 
helps to dampen, and even reverse, the 
effects of political conflict on trade. 
Thus political problems that limit 
economic integration in south Asia 
are likely to become more tractable if 
the whole region is tied more closely 
into positive trade and economic 
relations, trans-regionally and globally, 
and committed to full observance of 
the global rules of trade. EAFQ
East Asian economies enjoy high levels of trade and economic integration, despite unresolved historical 
issues and long-standing political mistrust in some of the region’s bilateral relationships.
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